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COMMENTS 
Wilkins v. Bentley:* Getting Out the Student Vote 
in Michigan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to vote is one of the most precious constitutional rights. 
The Supreme Court has described it as preservative of all rights,1 a 
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society,2 and a bedrock 
of our political system.3 Justice Black once stated, "No right is more 
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election 
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
live."4 It supports not only the individual's personal interest in self-
government, but also the collective societal interest in broadly based 
consensual representation. The magnitude of these interests suggests 
a strong policy favoring extension of the franchise with as few 
limitations as possible. 
On the other hand, conditions on suffrage may further legitimate 
state interests that include promoting intelligent use of the ballot,11 
identifying the voter and preventing voting fraud,6 and assuring the 
voter's membership and interest in the community.7 These interests 
suggest a competing policy favoring some conditions on suffrage in 
order to safeguard and effectuate the electoral process. The Supreme 
Court has recognized that the states "have long been held to have 
broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of 
suffrage may be exercised."8 However, it is equally clear that condi-
tions imposed by the states on suffrage must be consistent with all 
limitations on governmental power imposed by the Constitution.0 
The constitutionality of voting qualifications is an issue brought 
sharply into focus by the current controversy regarding state resi-
dency requirements for student voters.10 Students face a serious 
• 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W .2d 423 (1971). 
I. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561·62 (1964). 
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). 
4. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). 
5. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County 13d. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959), 
6. See, e.g., Hall v. l3eals, 292 F. Supp. 610, 614 (D. Colo. 1968); Sola v. Sanchez 
Vilella, 270 F. Supp. 459, 464 (D.P.R. 1967), afjd., 390 F.2d 160 (1st Cir. 1968); Drueding 
v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md. 1964), afjd. per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965). 
7. See cases cited in note 6 supra. 
8. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959). Accord, 
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1903); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335 (1900). 
9. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (equal protection and 
due process); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1964) (equal protection); Jolicoeur v. 
Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971) (twenty-sixth amendment). 
IO. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set out in note 17 infra, See 
[920] 
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problem because state residency statutes often contain special require-
ments that effectively bar them from voing in local elections.11 This 
problem has only been intensified since the twenty-sixth amendment 
to the United States Constitution lowered the minimum voting age 
to eighteen, thereby significantly increasing the number of potential 
student voters. 
The frustrations, fears, and tensions surrounding these statutes 
are aptly illustrated by recent reports in newspapers and magazines 
across the country. A classic statement of the problem comes from 
an Illinois state representative: "For goodness sakes, we could have 
these transients actually controlling the elections, voting city councils 
and mayors in or out of offi.ce."12 A related fear is expressed by the 
New Hampshire Attorney General: "They [students] float a bond 
issue and then move on, and who's left holding the bag?"18 On the 
other hand, advocates of student registration contend that since 
students pay local taxes and are subject to authority of local govern-
ment they should also have a hand in the city's administration.14 The 
courts are presently re-examining the issue of student participation 
in local elections. The early returns are in the students' favor.15 
II. THE WILKINS DECISION 
In Wilkins v. Bentley16 the Michigan supreme court considered a 
challenge to the state's residency requirement for students.17 The 
generally Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 703, 721-23 (1970). 
Statutes defining residence are to be distinguished ftom statutes setting forth durational 
residence requirements (i.e., those which prescribe the length of time a citizen must 
reside in a particular locality). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 
21, 1972). See generally Macleod &: Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements 
and Civil Rights, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1969); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Elections-Durational Residency Requirement, 23 S. CAR. L. REv. 320 (1971). 
11. See Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARv. CIV. 
RIGHTS·CIV. Lm. L. REv. 397 (1971); Note, Restrictions on Student Voting: An Unconsti-
tutional Anachronism?, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 215 (1970). 
12. Otten, Should Collegians Vote at Home or at School?, Wall St. J., April 15, 
1971, at 1, col. 6 (statement by m. State Rep. Robert Michel). 
13. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1971, at 27 (statement by N.H. Attorney General Warren 
Rudman). 
14. Michigan Daily, Sept. 9, 1971, at 3, col. 6. 
15. Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. KY. 1971), Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 
670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). 
16. 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971). 
17. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.11 (1967) (emphasis added), provides: 
(a) The term "residence," as used in this act, for registration and voting 
purposes shall be construed to mean that place at which a person habitually sleeps, 
keeps his or her personal effects and has a regular place of lodging. Should a person 
have more than 1 residence, or should a wife have a residence separate ftom that 
of the husband, that place at which such person resides the greater part of the 
time shall be his or her official residence •••• This section shall not be construed 
to affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence. 
(b) No elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of 
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plaintiff-students maintained their regular place of lodging in Ann 
Arbor and satisfied the general residency requirements applicable to 
other citizens.18 The students, however, were denied the right to 
register and vote in Ann Arbor under a special section of the state 
residency statute that provides: "No elector shall be deemed to have 
gained or lost a residence . . . while a student at any institution of 
learning."19 This provision had long been held to mean that the 
student must overcome a rebuttable presumption that he is not a 
resident in the locale of the institution of learning.20 It would seem 
that the presumption could be rebutted by some showing of an 
intention to remain in the locale,21 although it was established that 
a mere declaration of intention by the student would not suffice to 
establish residence.22 The Michigan decisions failed to indicate pre-
cisely what factors would rebut the presumption.23 Against this 
background the Michigan supreme court held that the student resi-
dency provision violated the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Federal Constitution.24 
his being employed in the service of the United States or of this state, nor while 
engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state or of the United States or 
of the high seas, nor while a student at any institution of learning, nor while kept 
at any almshouse or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any 
public prison. Honorably discharged members of the armed forces of the United 
States or of this state and who reside in the veterans' facility established by this 
state may acquire a residence where the facility is located. 
(c) No member of the armed forces of the United States shall be deemed a 
resident of this state in consequence of being stationed in any military or naval 
place within the state. 
18. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 168.U(a) (1967), set out in note 17 supra. 
19. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set out in note 17 supra. 
20. Attorney General ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934): 
People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912); Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97 Mich. 361, 
56 N.W. 837 (1893). 
21. See Note, supra note 11, at 216-21 (detailed history and analysis of Michigan 
law-a presumption against student voting). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 406· 
09 (students as residents); Note, Student Vating and Apportionment: The "Rotten 
Boroughs" of Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35, 39-42 (1971) (case law of student voting and 
residence). 
22. People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 143, 148, 135 N.W. 921, 923 (1912), 
23. Factors which various state courts have considered to be relevant include the 
following: a student's gainful employment in the college community, home owner-
ship with no present intention of pulling up stakes, apartment dwelling as head 
of family, holding a teaching and research assistantship, stated intention to make 
the university town a home upon graduation, year-round residence, financial 
independence from parents, and payment of local property and income ta.xes. 
Note, supra note II, at 220 (footnotes omitted). See generally Singer, supra note 10, at 
721-23; Comment, supra note 11, at 404-06, 408-09; Note, Election Laws as Legal Road-
blocks to Voting, 55 IOWA L. REV. 616 (1970); Note, supra note 11, at 239-43 (Appendix 
of student voter questionnaires used in different Michigan cities). 
24. 385 Mich. at 678, 694, 189 N.W.2d at 426-27, 434. The court also found 
corresponding violations of the Michigan Constitution. 385 Mich. at 679, 694, 189 
N.W .2d at 427, 434. 
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III. Dm: PROCESS 
The starting point for the court's due process analysis was the 
statement that the right to vote is "a fundamental political right, 
because preservative of all rights,"25 and that "courts have closely 
scrutinized any law that interferes with fundamental rights to insure 
that they are not unduly vague or give local officials unfettered dis-
cretion."26 The court noted that in cases involving voter registration, 
the Supreme Court has struck down such state laws.21 Substantial 
reliance was placed upon the language of Justice Black in Louisiana 
v. United States: 28 " 'The cherished right of people in a country like 
ours to vote cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which 
leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of 
an individual registrar.' "29 The court found common ground be-
tween the problems faced by students in the instant case and those 
faced by blacks in Louisiana: 
Although the voter qualification tests involved [in Louisiana] 
were used to disfranchise blacks, thus bringing into play the :fifteenth 
as well as the fourteenth amendment, the inherent vagueness of the 
interpretation test and the imprecise criteria used by the registrars 
presented prospective black voters with a dilemma analogous to that 
faced today by students."30 
Having established the legal principle against discretion in the 
voter registration context, the court proceeded to find that Michigan 
registrars were in fact allowed unfettered discretion under the stu-
dent voter registration provision: 
"[I]n Michigan ... the standards which students must meet in order 
to vote in the locality in which their college is located are extremely 
vague. . . . [T]hus each registration clerk determines himself which 
factors will overcome the presumption against student registrability 
in his city."31 
The court found that "[t]he record in this case amply supports this 
assertion."32 In addition it noted a concession made by the Ann 
25. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425, quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
370 (1886). 
26. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425. As authority for this proposition the court 
cited Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), a case that dealt with a prior restraint on 
free speech. 
27. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425. 
28. 380 U.S. 145 (1965). 
29. 385 Mich. at 677, 189 N.W.2d at 425-26, quoting 380 U.S. at 153. 
30. 385 Mich. at 677, 189 N.W.2d at 426, quoting Note, supra note 11, at 221. 
31. 385 Mich. at 677-78, 189 N.W.2d at 426, quoting Note, supra note 11, at 220. 
32. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426. 
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Arbor city attorney that "while Ann Arbor uses an elaborate ques-
tionnaire before allowing students to register, the city clerk of Detroit 
(where . . . several colleges are located) does not ask any special 
questions of student registrants."88 Thus, the court held that the 
student residency provision was overbroad and granted a constitu-
tionally prohibited discretion to local clerks in Michigan.84 
The nature of the discretion held unconstitutional is not clear. 
If Wilkins is limited to its facts, the critical element of discretion 
may be the lack of any judicial or legislative standards or criteria, 
and the resulting range of questions asked by clerks in different 
areas. Assuming this discretionary element was cured by judicial 
construction or legislative enactment of standards establishing uni-
form state-wide questioning, it could be argued that an impermissible 
degree of discretion still inheres in the necessity for clerks to weigh 
the various criteria, deciding which factors might overcome the pre-
sumption against student residence. On the other hand, as long as 
subjective intent is relevant to students' residency, the administrative 
need for flexibility and decisions at a local level suggests that this 
kind of discretion-the weighing of uniform criteria-might be per-
missible. Thus, under a narrow reading of Wilkins, whether uniform 
state-·wide questioning would satisfy due process requirements re-
mains an open question. While some of the court's language may be 
read to condemn discretionary factor-weighing in and of itself, the 
court's suggestion, in dicta, that but for equal protection considera-
tions the due process violation might have been cured by judicial 
construction85 may support the constitutional sufficiency of uniform 
statewide questions. 
Assuming that uniform questioning would withstand due process 
problems, an additional problem arises. While it was not necessary to 
the due process holding on discretion, the Michigan supreme court 
summarily considered the nature of questions that registrars asked 
students in determining residence. The court stated: 
At the trial, the plaintiffs were asked questions concerning bank 
accounts; where they obtained their support; whether they owned or 
leased property, and where they spent their vacations. However, these 
33. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426. For a comparison of various questionnaires 
used by city clerks for student registration, see Note, supra note 11, at 239•43 (Appendix). 
34. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W .2d at 427. The court added that "[t]he ability to 
exercise the precious right to vote cannot depend on whether a student attends school 
in a large city or a smaller town." 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427, citing 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). It is interesting that this possible equal protection 
consideration arises as a direct consequence of unfettered discretion, a due process 
consideration. 
35. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427. See notes 109-12 infra and accompanying 
text. 
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questions concerning wealth, property ownership, and travel, if used 
as criteria to establish residence for voting purposes are constitu-
tionally impermissible.a6 
In making this broad assertion the court relied upon Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections,87 Kramer v. Union Free School District,88 
and Shapiro v. Thompson,89 within which cases classifications based 
respectively upon wealth, property ownership, and travel were struck 
down. 
There are ttvo difficulties with the court's interpretation of these 
cases. First, questions used as criteria to determine a fact (such as 
intent regarding residence) are not classifications per se. The term 
"classification," as related to equal protection considerations, has 
traditionally meant the "legislative classification" of the persons to 
whom the law applies. "This sense of 'classify' ... must be distin-
guished from the sense in which 'to classify' refers to the act of 
determining whether an individual is a member of a particular 
class."40 However, a showing of a one-to-one correlation between the 
answer to a question and the decision to register the student could 
arguably support a finding of classification. Even assuming such ques-
tions to be classifications they would not be invalid per se. The state 
would have the opportunity to demonstrate compelling interests.41 
Thus the court's suggestion that questions regarding bank accounts, 
home ownership, and vacation travel are constitutionally impermis-
sible as criteria to establish residence should be viewed with extreme 
caution. Nevertheless, this problem is independent of the holding 
that the Michigan student residency provision violated due process 
since it granted, at least in the absence of uniform state standards, 
a constitutionally prohibited discretion to local clerks in Michigan. 
A. The Scope of Louisiana v. United States 
The language relied on from Louisiana seems strikingly suscep-
tible of application to the facts of Wilkins, as the voting fate of stu-
dents was indeed being left to "the passing whim or impulse of an 
individual registrar."42 If, however, the principle is applied that the 
language of a decision must be construed in light of its constitu-
36. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W. 2d at 426 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
Concerning wealth as a classification, see note 119 infra. 
37. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
38. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
39. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
40. Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 
344 (1949). 
41. See text accompanying notes 167-89 supra. 
42, See text aa;ompanying note 29 supra, 
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tionally significant facts, the Wilkins result does not flow automati-
cally from Louisiana. Indeed, it may represent a significant extension 
of prior case law. The thesis of this section is that the Wilkins due 
process holding, nevertheless, rests firmly upon constitutional prin-
ciples, reason, and policy, and is a fulfillment of the doctrinal prom-
ise, made in Louisiana, to safeguard voter registration from unfet-
tered discretion of local officials. 
Critics of the Wilkins decision might contend that Louisiana 
should be read narrowly in light of the facts ·of that case. At issue in 
Louisiana was an "interpretation test," under which a voter registra-
tion applicant was required to "understand" and "give a reasonable 
interpretation" of any section of the state or federal constitution 
"when read to him by the registrar."43 This discretionary registration 
process differed in several ways from the discretion held unconsti-
tutional in Wilkins. First, the Court in Louisiana stressed that the 
interpretation test "was part of a successful plan to deprive Louisiana 
Negroes of their right to vote."44 Thus, the discretion which was held 
unconstitutional in Louisiana might be viewed not as a constitu-
tionally impermissible evil in and of itself, but rather as an element 
of an over-all plan to disenfranchise blacks. It could be contended 
that this discriminatory plan was essential to the Louisiana holding. 
Weight is given to this argument by the alternative holdings in 
Louisiana that the interpretation test not only violated fourteenth 
amendment due process and equal protection,46 but also violated the 
fifteenth amendment on the ground that the interpretation test 
"specifically conflicted with prohibitions against discriminations in 
voting because of race."46 In Schnell v. Davis,47 mentioned by the 
Court in Louisiana as being "squarely in point,"48 discretion in a 
voter registration context similar to that in Louisiana was held to 
violate the equal protection clause and the fifteenth amendment, 
with no mention being made of due process. Furthermore, while 
Louisiana has been relied upon in a successful attack on discretion 
in a jury selection process,49 it has usually been cited only as authority 
43. 380 U.S. at 149. 
44. 380 U.S. at 151. 
45. The express language of the Court was: "[W]e • • • affirm here the District 
Court's holding that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes which 
require voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to 'understand and give a reasonable 
interpretation of any section' of the Federal or Louisiana Constitution violate the 
Constitution." 380 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). The district court expressly found 
violations of both due process and equal protection. 225 F. Supp. 353, 391 (E,D. La. 
1963). 
46. 380 U.S. at 153. 
47. 336 U.S. 933, a/Jg. per curiam 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949). 
48. 380 U.S. at 153. 
49. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 51 n.34 (5th Cir. 1966). Sec also 
Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d 1, 7 n.13 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum). But see Carter v. 
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for equal protection or fifteenth amendment decisions.60 
A second distinction is that in Louisiana the Court stressed both 
the history of discrimination against blacks61 and the striking evi-
dence that discrimination resulted from the registrar's unfettered 
discretion: 
As the evidence showed, colored people, even some with the most 
advanced education and scholarship, were declared by voting regis-
trars with less education to have an unsatisfactory understanding of 
the Constitution of Louisiana or of the United States.62 
Comparable evidence of blatant abuse of discretion was not presented 
in Wilkins.63 Moreover, it could be argued that a court should scru-
tinize discretion more vigorously to protect blacks than to protect 
students, and that the analogy between blacks and students as facing 
many of the same problems is overstated. 
While these distinctions carry some weight, their significance 
should not be exaggerated to the point that sight of the obvious is 
lost. When viewed as a whole, the thrust of the Louisiana decision 
is well represented by the language of Justice Black relied upon by 
the Wilkins court. Above all else, the Court in Louisiana repeatedly 
stressed the elements of unfettered discretion.64 Citing United States 
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,65 a traditional due process vagueness case, 
it stated that "[m]any of our cases have pointed out the invalidity of 
laws so completely devoid of standards and restraints."66 Moreover, 
Jury Commn., 396 U.S. 320 (1970). Cf. People v. Ferguson, 55 l\fisc. 2d 711, 713, 286 
N.Y .S.2d 976, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
Louisiana has also been cited in dicta in several cases for its antidiscretion principles. 
See Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1262 n.4 (7th Cir. 1970); Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 
223,228 n.7, 466 P.2d 244,247 n.7, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 n.7 (1970). 
50. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966); Haney v. Country Bd. of 
~m~~-~~~~~~~~~~~m~ 
Cir. 1965). 
51. See 380 U.S. at 147-50. See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301, 309 (1966). 
For cases involving attacks on continuing discriminatory practices in Louisiana 
after Louisiana, see United States v. Palmer, 356 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1966); United States 
v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lucky, 239 F. Supp. 233 (W.D. 
La. 1965); Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965); Davis v. Gallinghouse, 
246 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. La. 1965); United States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan, 
250 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965). 
52. 380 U.S. at 153. 
53. The city clerk estimated that "between 85 and 90 per cent of those students 
seeking to register are permitted to do so." Brief for Appellee at 3, Wilkins v. Bentley, 
385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W .2d 423 (1971). 
54. E.g., "no definite and objective standards," "no effective method whereby 
arbitrary and capricious action by registrars • • • may be prevented or redressed," 
"official's uncontrolled power." 380 U.S. at 152, 153. 
55. 255 U.S. 81 (1921). 
56. 380 U.S. at 153. 
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the alternative holdings in Louisiana do not detract from the man-
date against vagueness in the voter registration context, for it is 
normal judicial practice to develop new doctrinal applications while 
holding alternatively on well-established grounds.67 It also appears 
that in light of the commonly accepted rationale for striking down 
vague statutes-the lack of fair warning to the individual subject to 
the statute and the inadequate guidance to the trier of factli8-evi-
dence of actual discrimination is not necessary to a due process viola-
tion. Finally, while analogy between blacks and students may be 
weak, the proper focus should be on the nature of the voting regis-
tration process, and not upon the identity of the applicants for regis-
tration. In other words, it is solicitude for protection of the right to 
vote that should compel application of the vagueness doctrine, and 
not solicitude for blacks or for students.69 In summary, it is sub-
mitted that Louisiana does rest primarily on a due process right 
against vagueness and unfettered discretionary procedures in voter 
registration. 
B. The Critical Elements: Discretion and Voting 
Louisiana, by its own weight, should compel the decision in 
Wilkins that the student residency provision violates the due process 
clause. If, however, any doubt exists as to the scope of Louisiana in 
due process cases, it is useful to consider tw'O ancillary questions. 
First, is the decision consistent ·with the range of established consti-
tutional principles against discretion and the rationales underlying 
these principles? Second, does special significance attach by reason 
of the voter registration context? It is suggested that the answers to 
these questions strongly support the Wilkins due process result. 
I. The Established Principles Against Discretion 
a. Statutes void for vagueness. Some cases related to Wilkins have 
been decided under the long established void-for-vagueness doc-
trine.60 In these decisions the Court scrutinized state and federal 
statutes to resolve whether their "words and phrases are so vague 
and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation consti-
57. Although the vagueness doctrine was well established prior to Louisiana, the 
Supreme Court had never applied it to voter registration. See generally Amsterdam, 
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). 
58. This rationale has often been noted by courts and commentators. See, e.g., 
Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 
524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); 
Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 68 n.3; Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 
4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 541 (1951). 
59. See text accompanying notes 89-108 infra. 
60. For a thorough collection of such cases and discussion of the vagueness doctrine, 
see Amsterdam, supra note 57. 
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tutes a denial of due process of Iaw."61 Wilkins differs from tradi-
tional vagueness cases because the traditional cases involve scrutiny 
of penal statutes,62 while the statute in issue in Wilkins was one that 
placed residency qualifications on the right to vote. However, ex-
amination of the policies underlying traditional vagueness cases 
suggests that this distinction should not compel a different result. 
As previously noted, the rationale behind the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine rests upon ttvo requirements of due process: fair notice to 
the individual who is subject to the statute, and adequate guidance to 
the trier of fact.63 As to the first, fundamental fairness clearly requires 
adequate notice of acts that will result in a criminal penalty.64 It is 
submitted that fundamental fairness also requires fair notice of 
affirmative acts that are required as a condition precedent to the 
exercise of a fundamental right. For example, some students might 
have been unable to establish residence in Ann Arbor because of a 
lack of notice of what acts were acceptable to the registrars as evi-
dence of bona fide residence. For those students the loss of voting 
rights may be characterized as substantially similar to a "penalty" 
that is not preceded by fair warning.65 
Does the "guidance for the trier of fact" rationale apply strongly 
to Wilkins? In a narrow sense, registrars are not "triers of fact" if 
that term is to be limited to the trial situation. Voting registrars, how-
ever, if administering a rebuttable presumption against students' 
residence, must make factual determinations in the sensitive context 
of voting rights. Judges are trained to reason impartially, and juries 
may be said to represent the voice of the community;66 yet the law 
61. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commn., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932). 
"Although it is usual to conceive of the void-for-vagueness cases as cases in which 
the Supreme Court passes upon the 'face' validity of statutes, in fact what the Court 
is far more frequently reviewing is a state court's reading of the challenged statute." 
Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 68 n.4 (citations omitted). Thus in Wilkins the court 
found no vagueness in the literal terms of MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 168.ll(b) (1967), set 
out in note 17 supra. Rather, vagueness principles were applied to the statute as it 
had been construed by the Michigan courts "to mean that a student must overcome 
a rebuttable presumption that he is not a resident in the locale of the institution of 
learning." 385 Mich. at 675, 189 N.W .2d at 425. 
62. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute proscribing sale of 
obscene literature); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (statute 
proscribing unreasonable charges in handling necessaries). 
63. See authorities cited in note 58 supra. 
64. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
65. Application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not limited to cases involving 
a "penalty" created by a penal statute. See Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) 
(civil statute permitting jurors to determine whether an acquitted defendant must 
pay costs held void for vagueness in absence of any standards preventing arbitrary 
imposition of costs). It is, of course, possible that even if given notice of the factors 
considered by the registrars, students would not change their activities. 
66. See, e.g., Sioux City 8e P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873). But cf. J. FRANK, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-81 (1930). 
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requires standards to guard against discretionary decision by these 
presumably impartial triers of fact.67 Similarly, legal standards should 
be imposed to guard against vesting discretion in voting registrars, 
who by virtue of their politically oriented office may be more prone 
to arbitrary action than a judge or jury. 
b. "Overbroad" statutes. Some related cases involving "over-
broad" statutes have used nvo additional grounds to support a finding 
of unconstitutionality: (I) the potential danger of discriminatory en-
forcement, and (2) the resulting chilling effect of such a statute on 
constitutionally protected activity.68 Do these rationales apply with 
force to Wilkins? 
The "potential discriminatory enforcement" and "chilling effect" 
rationales are illustrated by NAACP v. Button.69 At issue was the 
constitutionality of a statute that banned solicitation of certain legal 
business, including that of being an agent "for any ... organization 
or association which employs, retains, or compensates any attorney at 
law in connection with any judicial proceeding . . . in which it has 
no pecuniary right or liability."70 The state court had held that the 
activities of the NAACP legal staff constituted solicitation of legal 
business.71 However, the Supreme Court found that the statute 
violated first amendment freedoms: 
It is enough that a vague and broad statute lends itself to selective en-
forcement against unpopular causes. We cannot close our eyes to the 
fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered 
the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant 
white community of Virginia • . . In such circumstances, a statute 
broadly curtailing group activity leading to litigation may easily be-
come a weapon of oppression, however even handed its terms appear. 
Its mere existence could well freeze out of existence all such activity 
on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens.72 
67. See note 58 supra and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Cf. Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1961). 
The Thornhill case contains the classic statement of the overbreadth doctrine: 
[The penal statute in question here] does not aim specifically at evils within 
the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit 
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of 
speech or of the press. The existence of such a statute, which readily lends itself 
to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against 
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a continuous and 
pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded 
as within its purview. 
310 U.S. at 97-98. The problem of the overbroad statute has been described as "a 
special case of the problem of vagueness." Freund, supra note 58, at 540. 
69. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
70. 371 U.S. at 423 n.7. 
71. 371 U.S. at 424-26, 426 n.9. Prominent among the activities of the legal staff 
was "to explain to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to 
achieve desegregation." 371 U.S. at 421. 
72, 371 U.S. at 435-36 (emphasis added). 
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The "chilling effect" rationale does not apply with great strength 
in the Wilkins context. While vague standards may create some dis-
incentive to student attempts to register, it is unclear whether they 
will operate as a significant deterrent. Students have only their time 
to lose, and do not face the threat of criminal sanction. 
The "discriminatory enforcement" rationale, however, is strik-
ingly applicable to Wilkins. This rationale has been stressed in con-
texts not involving racial tensions73 and in light of the strong oppo-
sition to student registration often expressed by some members of 
the community, 74 there exists a real danger that a registrar might 
intentionally discriminate against students. This danger may be fur-
ther illustrated by Cox v. Louisiana.75 At issue in Cox was a statute 
providing criminal sanction for breach of peace that the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutionally overbroad.76 In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Black stated: 
Such a statute does not provide for government by clearly defined 
laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opinions 
of a policeman on his beat .... This kind of statute provides a per-
fect device to arrest people whose views do not suit the policeman or 
his superiors, while leaving free to talk anyone ·with whose views the 
police agree.77 
Similarly, the ability to register and vote should be a function of 
"clearly defined laws" rather than the "passing whim or impulse of 
an individual registrar."78 
c. Prior restraint cases. Another group of cases that may be com-
pared profitably to Wilkins are those in which statutes have been 
held unconstitutional under the first amendment as prior restraints 
devoid of standards. In these cases the Court has proclaimed that the 
Constitution does not allow administrative officials unfettered dis-
cretionary control over the fundamental rights of freedom of speech 
and religion.79 
As an illustration, in Kunz v. New York,80 the Court considered 
a statute that required a permit as a condition precedent to conduct-
ing religious services in public places; it held that "New York cannot 
73. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (statute proscribing 
"loitering" and "picketing" as applied to labor disputes). 
74. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra. 
75. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
76. 379 U.S. at 552. 
77. 379 U.S. at 579. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886). 
78. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). See also text accompanying 
notes 29-33 supra. 
79. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-58 (1965); Kunz v. New· York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saii v. 
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
80. 340 U.S. 290 (1951). 
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vest restraining control over the right to speak on religious subjects 
in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards 
to guide his action."81 Similarly, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 82 the Court struck down a statute requiring permits for parades 
or public demonstrations, stating that "a law subjecting the exercise 
of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, with-
out narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing 
authority, is unconstitutional."83 
In Wilkins, there were no "appropriate" or "narrow, objective, 
and definite standards" to guide the individual registrars, 84 yet in a 
rough sense these registrars were broadly empowered to administer 
prior restraints on the right to vote. Wilkins differs from Kunz and 
Shuttlesworth only in that the latter cases involved discretionary 
prior restraints upon first amendment rights, whereas Wilkins dealt 
with a discretionary restraint on the right to vote. The potential 
danger of unfettered administrative power stifling fundamental 
rights seems clear in either case. If one accepts the proposition that 
the right to vote deserves judicial protections as stringent as those 
afforded freedom of speech and religion, then the Court's mandate 
against unfettered discretion should apply in the Wilkins voter regis-
tration context. This proposition is commended by the Court's solic-
itude for the right to vote in equal protection settings.80 
Moreover, it may be contended that voting rights are even more 
in need of protection against unfettered discretion than are those 
of freedom of speech and religion. First, one may assume that many 
persons whose freedoms of speech or religion are infringed will 
vigorously fight for their rights and may even ignore a restraining 
statute, proceeding to demonstrate or speak at the risk of imprison-
ment if courts do not find the statute unconstitutional.86 On the 
other hand, the voter applicant may not be as committed to pro-
tecting his rights, because the individual who is refused registration 
and voting rights may not feel that his personal interests are seriously 
threatened. Therefore, the burden of safeguarding the interest in a 
fair and democratic voting process falls heavily upon the courts,87 re-
81. 340 U.S. at 295. On the other hand the Court has specifically illustrated the 
nature of a "limited discretion" that is constitutionally permissible if "exercised with 
'uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from 
improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination' • • • [and 
with] a 'systematic, consistent and just order of treatment' •••• " Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941), quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 91 N.H. 137, 143, 
16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940). See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). 
82. 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
83. 394 U.S. at 150-51. 
84. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. 
85. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra. 
86. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
87. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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quiring a strict standard of review over administrative discretion 
when voting registration procedures are at issue. 
Second, many individuals whose freedom of speech is infringed 
by a restraining statute may be able to find alternative, legally per-
missible, methods of communicating their ideas.88 On the other hand, 
while voter applicants who are refused registration might still par-
ticipate indirectly in local election processes-for example, through 
alternatives such as campaign activities and voter drives-these per-
sons suffer an absolute loss of their right to the direct participation 
in self-government in the college community. Finally, those indi-
viduals whose speech is infringed may use the vote to induce legisla-
tive change that would enable them to express their views more 
satisfactorily, whereas voter applicants who have been refused regis-
tration are left with significantly less leverage in the legislative 
process. 
2. The Significance of the Voting Context 
The preceding section analyzed the general treatment of "dis-
cretion" and demonstrated that Wilkins is consistent with a wide 
range of settled case law. It is useful to consider next what special 
significance should attach because Wilkins involved the voter regis-
tration context. 
It has been suggested by Professor Amsterdam that the void-for-
vagueness doctrine "has been used by the Supreme Court almost 
invariably ... [as a] buffer zone of added protection at the periph-
eries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms."89 In support of this 
thesis Professor Amsterdam pointed to the initial use of the vague-
ness doctrine in the business regulation context during the era in 
which the Court gave strong protection to property and contract 
rights, and its later use as a buffer for first amendment freedoms.90 
Significantly, Professor Amsterdam's article was written in 1960, 
prior to Reynolds v. Sims91 and the host of cases92 establishing voting 
rights as those perhaps most highly protected by the Court. The 
logical extension of his thesis is that the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
should be used by the Court to establish "buffer zone" protection 
against discretion in the voting rights area. In retrospect, Louisiana 
may be viewed as the genesis and Wilkins as a strong endorsement 
of such "buffer zone" protection for voting rights. 
88, For a full discussion of the problem of reasonable alternatives, see Blasi, Prior 
Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1497-1501 (1970). 
89. Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 75. 
90. Id. at 84-85. Cf. Freund, supra note 58, at 540. 
91. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
92, E.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free 
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
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A second reason for requiring strict review of vagueness and 
discretion in the voter registration context is suggested by decisions 
under the equal protection clause. When a voting right is infringed, 
the Court has adopted, in lieu of traditional equal protection stan-
dards, the "strict scrutiny" of the "compelling state interest" test.03 
Voting rights should also command stringent review against vague-
ness and discretion. 
In light of these reasons for protecting voting rights with the 
vagueness doctrine, it is useful to examine Carter v. Jury Commis-
sion,94 the only case in which the Supreme Court squarely considered 
application of the Louisiana holding on vagueness, and one that 
might seem to preclude application of Louisiana to the Wilkins case. 
In Carter, the Court refused to apply Louisiana to an attack on vague 
statutory standards concerning jury selection, holding that the statute 
"requiring the jury commissioners to select for jury service those 
persons who are 'generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and 
. . . esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character 
and sound judgment'" was not unconstitutional on its face.0u In 
refusing to apply Louisiana, the Court stressed that there was "no 
suggestion that the law was originally adopted or subsequently car-
ried forward for the purpose of fostering racial discrimination. "00 
The treatment of Louisiana in Carter might suggest that the Louisi-
ana principle invalidating a statute governing voter registration for 
lack of standards will not apply absent a finding of discriminatory 
purpose or application. But several factual distinctions between Lou-
isiana and Carter indicate that this conclusion is not justified. 
First, Carter involved jury rights97 and the Court might well have 
made a less stringent review of vagueness than it would have in a 
voting rights case.98 Thus Carter may suggest only that in the context 
of attacks on jury exclusion the Court ·will look not only for vague-
ness and discretion, but also for discriminatory purpose as prerequi-
sites to holding a statute void on its face. But if one accepts the 
notion that the vagueness doctrine should provide a "buffer zone" 
for voting rights, then Carter is not inconsistent with the application 
of Louisiana principles against discretion in the voter registration 
93. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra. 
94. 396 U.S. 320 (1970). 
95. 396 U.S. at 331. 
96. 396 U.S. at 336. 
97. The essence of the constitutional attack in Carter was that qualified blacks were 
being systematically excluded from Greene County, Alabama, grand and petit juries, 396 
U.S. at 321-30. 
98. The suggestion that voting rights deserve greater protection than jury rights 
finds support in the Court's characterization of voting rights as "preservative of all 
rights," Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), and "of the essence in a 
democratic society," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 535 (1964), 
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context even absent an allegation or finding of discriminatory pur-
pose. Moreover, this construction of Carter is consistent with a recog-
nition that judicial review of legislative motive is disfavored,99 and 
that the focus should be upon the nature of the infringed right. 
A second factual distinction between Carter and the Louisiana or 
Wilkins cases centers around the quantitative degree of vagueness in 
the statutes at issue. While in Carter the words in the statute were 
susceptible of varying meaning, it is arguable that the exercise of 
discretion by jury commissioners was not as totally unfettered as that 
present in Louisiana or Wilkins. The statute in Carter at least pur-
ported to set forth standards for decision: the commissioners could 
exercise discretion within the ambit of meaning attributable to words 
such as "honest" and "intelligent,"100 but they could not use any 
standards whatsoever for jury selection. In contrast, in Louisiana a 
wider latitude arguably existed in defining what would constitute 
a "reasonable interpretation" of the Constitution,101 and in Wilkins 
there were no state-wide standards regarding what evidence might 
rebut the presumption against a student's residence.102 Moreover, in 
a factual setting where jury commissioners exercised "unfettered 
discretion," by choosing jurors on the basis of subjective standards 
not included in the federal statutory scheme, one court relied on 
Louisiana, absent evidence of discriminatory purpose, in holding that 
violation of the statutory plan required reversal of convictions by 
improperly drawn juries.103 Thus, if the jury commissioners in Carter 
had been vested with a higher degree of discretion, it is possible that 
the Court might have applied Louisiana without evidence of dis-
criminatory purpose, even in the jury selection context. 
A third reason for requiring registrars to make decisions in ac-
cordance with uniform and specific standards is that the evils of 
discretionary denials of voting rights are magnified when there is 
no method by which a voter applicant can obtain adequate judicial 
review of a registrar's decision. This problem was considered by the 
district court in Louisiana.104' That court stated: 
The State does not deny that unlimited discretion is vested in the 
registrars by the laws of Louisiana, but argues that officials must act 
reasonably and that their decisions are subject to review by district 
courts. Louisiana, however, provides no effective method whereby 
99. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949). But see 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (egregious legislative gerrymander suggested 
that legislation was solely concerned with fencing Negro citizens out of town so as 
to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote). 
100. See text accompanying note 95 supra. 
101. See 380 U.S. at 148. 
102. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra. 
103. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). 
104. 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963). See text accompanying notes 42-59 supra. 
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arbitrary and capricious action by registrars of voters may be pre-
vented or redressed. Unreviewable discretion was built in the test.10r; 
Uniform standards guiding registrars' decisions are necessary to facil-
itate judicial review, and this minimum requirement supports the 
Wilkins decision. 
In addition to uniform standards, it might be contended that even 
greater procedural protection should be afforded the voting process. 
It has been held that procedural safeguards to facilitate an expedi-
tious review of film censorship are required by the Constitution.100 
Moreover, there is emerging doctrinal authority for expeditious re-
view procedures in other first amendment contexts.107 As Justice 
Harlan has stated, "[7]iming is of the essence in politics . ... [W]hen 
an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard 
promptly, if it is to be considered at all."108 Similarly, time is of the 
essence in voting since once an election has been held, no judicial 
decision can restore the right to participate in the past event. Expedi-
tious review procedures are necessary to safeguard voting rights. 
C. Conclusion 
The Louisiana decision should govern the invalidation of the 
vaguely construed Michigan residency provision. If any doubt exists 
regarding the scope of Louisiana in due process cases, absent evi-
dence of discriminatory purpose or application, the rationales under-
lying a broad range of settled case law suggest that vague statutes 
touching upon voting rights violate the due process clause. This posi-
tion is supported by the general legal proscriptions against unfettered 
discretion, and by the special significance and protections that attach 
when voting rights are in issue. Finally, it is difficult to imagine any 
competing state policies that would compel a contrary result in 
Wilkins. Little can be said for any policy that unnecessarily fosters 
unfettered discretion. In fact, it seems to be in a state's best interest 
to define accurately the class to which legislation applies, and to 
establish specific standards by which administrative officials may 
reliably determine which individuals are members of the defined 
class. 
The impact of the Wilkins due process holding upon the Michi-
gan student residency provision is perhaps not as devastating as might 
105. 225 F. Supp. at 384 (emphasis added). This passage was cited in part by the 
Supreme Court. 380 U.S. at 152. 
106. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
107. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n.4, 159-64 (1969). 
See generally Blasi, supra note 88, at 1534-50; Monaghan, First Amendment "Due 
Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970). 
108. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
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first appear. The Michigan supreme court commented that "if this 
[ due process violation] were the only infirmity of the statute, we 
could correct this defect by issuing guidelines consistent with the 
Constitution."109 There is authority for judicial "saving" of a vague 
statute by construction.110 Moreover, even if a judicial "saving con-
struction" would have been improper in Wilkins,111 the legislature 
might have re-enacted a similar provision including standards for 
registrars sufficient to ·withstand due process attack. In short, the 
due process holding standing alone proscribes only the discretionary 
manner of administrative action. 
In light of the subsequent equal protection holding invalidating 
the statutory provision, the Michigan supreme court refrained from 
issuing guidelines for registrars to cure the discretion.112 That equal 
protection holding is potentially of more far-reaching consequence 
than the finding of a constitutionally prohibited unfettered discre-
tion in the registrars. 
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION 
A. The Applicable Equal Protection Standard 
As the starting point for its equal protection analysis, the Michi-
gan supreme court faced the problem of determining the equal pro-
tection standard applicable in reviewing the constitutionality of the 
student residency provision.113 Most statutory classifications, such as 
those affecting economic rights, have been upheld under the equal 
protection clause where it is shown that the legislature had a reason-
able basis for the classification, or, in other words, where the classifica-
tion was not purely arbitrary.114 On the other hand, in several types 
109. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W .2d 427. 
110. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1969); 
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1941). See also Freund, supra note 58, at 
540-41: 
Can an overbroad statute be saved by construction? If the limiting construction 
is a relatively simple and natural one it can probably be made to save the statute. 
A law requiring street parades to be licensed, but containing no standards to 
govern the grant of a license, appears to be invalid on its face, and yet when the 
highest court of the state interpreted it to condition the grant or refusal of a 
license only on the basis of safety and convenience of traffic, the Supreme Court 
accepted the limitation and sustained a conviction. 
(Emphasis added.) 
111. When a "saving construction" would involve the promulgation of complex and 
lengthy standards in a setting of ambiguous legislative intent, it is arguable that 
court-made standards are insufficient and that legislative criteria are necessary. 
112. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427. 
113. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set forth in note 17 supra, 
114. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-29 (1961); Allied Stores of 
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 
U.S. 106 (1949); Gossaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See generally Developments in 
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1077-87 (1969). 
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of cases the Supreme Court has ruled that a more stringent review 
of legislative classification is applicable, requiring a higher degree of 
justification for the classification.115 
The first group of cases invoking this higher standard of review 
have been those in which the classification is "suspect" because of the 
nature of the group of persons singled out for different treatment. 
Thus, when classifications are based on race,116 alienage,117 or nation-
ality118 a heavy burden of justification must be met.119 In order to 
show this justification "[the classification] must be sho·wn to be nec-
essary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective."120 
Moreover, the Court may require that the state's objectives be suffi-
ciently important, relative to the obvious evils of the classification, to 
constitute a "legitimate overriding purpose."121 
A second group of cases involving the higher standard of justifica-
tion consist of those in which, without respect to the identity of the 
designated class, the classification infringes upon a fundamental con-
stitutional right.122 For example, the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. 
Thompson123 treated the right to travel as fundamental and stated: 
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appel-
lees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification 
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to 
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is un-
constitutional.124 
Thus the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right will 
invoke the strict equal protection standard commonly referred to as 
the "compelling state interest" doctrine.120 
In Wilkins, the court focused upon this second group of cases120 
115. See Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1087-1132, 
116. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 
184 (1965); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
117. E.g., Takahishi v. Fish & Grune Commn. 334 U.S. 410 (1948), 
118. E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
119. An unsettled question is whether "wealth" is a "suspect" classification. The 
Supreme Court's suggestions have been equivocal. Compare Jaincs v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 
137 (1971), with Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
120. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
122. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Skinner v. Okla• 
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procreation). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (right of marital privacy). 
123. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
124. 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added). 
125. For a discussion of the "compelling interest" doctrine, see notes 159-66 infra 
and accompanying text. 
126. Any contention that the compelling interest doctrine should be invoked on the 
ground that classification of "students" is suspect would be questionable. There is no 
April 1972] Comments 939 
involving the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right. Justice 
Swainson, speaking for the state supreme court, noted that "the right 
to vote is one of the most precious, if not the most precious, of all 
our constitutional rights."127 He amply supported this assertion by 
reference to relevant statements of the United States Supreme Court: 
"Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of 
people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right."128 
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of 
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right 
strike at the heart of representative government."129 
Moreover, Justice Swainson stated that "[t]he U. S. Supreme 
Court has applied the compelling interest test in recent cases involv-
ing the right to vote."180 By reference to these cases, including Car-
rington v. Rash,131 Kramer v. Union Free School District,132 Cipriano 
v. City of Houma,133 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,134 and Evans v. 
Corman,185 the court concluded that the compelling interest test must 
be applied to determine whether the student residency requirement 
violated the equal protection clause.136 
In reaching this result, the court rejected the defendant's conten-
tion that the above cases were distinguishable because they involved 
"an absolute denial of the right to vote" whereas the Michigan 
statute merely involved a "rebuttable presumption against gaining 
residence."187 Comparing the students' predicament to that of liti-
gants in the other cases, the court noted that in several ways the 
exclusion of students from the franchise was more absolute than the 
denials of voting rights in the allegedly distinguishable cases. For 
example, ·with respect to servicemen denied the right to establish 
residence and vote in Carrington, the court stated: "All states allow 
authority for extending the "suspect classification" doctrine to include "students." See 
generally Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1087-91, 1124-27. 
127. 385 Mich. at 680, 189 N.W .2d at 427. 
128. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 427-28, quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1, 17 (1964). 
129. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 428, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
555 (1964). 
130. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W .2d at 428. 
131. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
132. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
133. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
134. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). 
135. 398 U.S. 419 (1970). 
136. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 428. 
137. 385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 428-29. 
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servicemen to vote by absentee ballot. In contrast, because of the 
various civilian absentee voters' laws, many students would be unable 
to register and vote anywhere."138 Moreover, the court reasoned, 
Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski involved statutes denying the 
right to vote only in "special elections" (for example, those involving 
bond issues and school district elections) and the litigants in those 
cases "still could vote for every office from president to local offi-
cials. "139 In contrast, some students would be left with no vote in 
local elections. 140 
As an additional reason for rejecting the defendant's contention, 
the court apparently found the distinction between an absolute de-
nial of voting rights and a burden on them imposed by a rebuttable 
presumption to be irrelevant to whether the compelling interest test 
should be applied. The Supreme Court had long noted that "the [Fif-
teenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded 
modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements 
which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race 
although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to 
race."141 Justice Swainson reasoned that "[t]he Equal Protection 
Clause likewise guards against subtle restraints on the right to vote, 
as well as outright denial."142 Additionally, the court relied upon 
the Supreme Court's concern with burdens on the right to vote, as 
expressed in Williams v. Rhodcs,143 wherein the Court stated: 
In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different, 
although overlapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals to 
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of 
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their 
votes effectively .... In determining whether the State has power to 
place such unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this 
kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court have consistently held 
that "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject 
within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limit-
ing First Amendment freedoms."144 
Thus the Michigan supreme court concluded that "the fact that a 
burden is placed on the right to vote because of the [statutory] rebut-
table presumption ... is sufficient to require the State to demonstrate 
a compelling interest."145 
138. 385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 429. 
139. 385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 429. 
140. 385 Mich. at 683-84, 189 N.W.2d at 429. 
141. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). 
142. 385 Mich. at 684, 189 N.W.2d at 429. 
143. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
144. 393 U.S. at 30-31 (emphasis added). 
145. 385 Mich. at 685, 189 N.W.2d at 429. 
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The refutation of the alleged distinction between absolute denial 
of the right to vote and a rebuttable presumption affecting voting 
rights appears sound, particularly in light of the fact that it was con-
ceded that the effect of the rebuttable presumption on the litigants 
was a denial of the right to vote in Ann Arbor.146 Moreover, the State 
did not contend that these students could vote elsewhere, even if such 
an alternative were assumed relevant. 
On the other hand, the court's proposition that a "burden" on 
the right to vote invokes the "compelling interest" test needs qualifi-
cation. The court's assertion rests on sound ground as long as it is 
limited to the narrow situation where the magnitude of the "burden" 
demonstrably dilutes voting rights, as in Williams, or where it results 
in denial of voting rights, as in Wilkins. However the court left un-
answered the question of what magnitude of burden is necessary for 
invocation of the compelling interest doctrine. Obviously, all bur-
dens on voting rights should not suffice. For example, while a require-
ment that voter applicants register at the City Hall between specified 
hours places some burden on those persons for whom the locale and 
timing are inconvenient, surely the court did not intend that its 
proposition stretch this far. Moreover, the notion that certain bur-
dens on the right to vote may not invoke the compelling interest test 
finds support in a Supreme Court decision holding that the denial of 
absentee ballots to prisoners is not a burden sufficient to invoke the 
compelling interest doctrine absent an allegation that the right to 
vote was denied.147 
Taken as a whole, the Court's decisions in the voting rights con-
text demonstrate the utmost concern for and strict scrutiny of all 
aspects of the electoral process that may cause a denial or serious dilu-
tion of voting rights, including dilution through apportionment,148 
limited ballot choice,149 durational residency requirements,150 con-
clusive bars to residency,151 and other qualifications on the right to 
vote.152 The protections afforded voting rights could be rendered 
meaningless if the states were able to circumvent these protections by 
a threshold determination of nonresidency. A decision to apply only 
the traditional equal protection test to special residency determina-
tive provisions raises the credible danger that such tests might be 
146. 385 Mich. at 674, 185 N.W.2d at 424. 
147. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm.rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). See also Bullock 
v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972). 
148. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
149. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
150. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 21, 1972). 
151. Evans v. Corman, 389 U.S. 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
152. E.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (real property ownership); 
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (leasing or ownership of prop-
erty or children in schools). 
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utilized in efforts to disenfranchise minority groups.11i8 The Court 
should apply the compelling interest doctrine to residency-determina-
tive provisions that stand critically at the threshold of the electoral 
process.154 
Thus, the Michigan supreme court's decision to apply the compel-
ling interest test seems well grounded in both precedent and policy. 
In addition, a federal district court has recently followed its lead by 
applying the compelling interest test to a similar student residency 
provision.155 
There can be no doubt that the decision in Wilkins to apply the 
"compelling interest" test is of immense significance. Special resi-
dency provisions for students are probably valid under the traditional 
equal protection test. Since most students do not intend to remain 
indefinitely in the locale, special treatment of students does not seem 
"wholly arbitrary."156 The fact that others equally transient are not 
subject to special provisions is not necessarily a critical flaw in the 
statute under this traditional standard, for as stated in Railway Ex-
press Agency v. New Y ork,151 "it is no requirement of equal protec-
tion that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."11i8 
In sharp contrast, Wilkins illustrates the extreme, and possibly insur-
mountable, difficulties in justifying special residency provisions for 
students under the compelling interest test. 
B. Mechanics and Application of the Compelling Interest Test 
The scrutiny given a statutory classification under the compelling 
state interest doctrine involves the combination of numerous judicial 
techniques utilized to test the state's justification for the statutory 
classification. First, in contrast to the "traditional" equal protection 
standard, the burden of justification rests on the state, and it must 
assert the nature of the interests the classification seeks to further. At 
this stage the Court may :find that an interest asserted by the state is 
"constitutionally impermissible."159 Second, the state must tailor the 
153. Cf. text accompanying note 141 supra. 
154. An additional argument for application of the compelling interest doctrine 
should also be noted. The Court has invoked the compelling interest test where the 
fundamental right of travel has been infringed. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394- U.S. 618 
(1969). Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). It could be argued that 
a rebuttable presumption against students' residence acts as a deterrent to interstate 
travel. The difficult question is whether such a deterrent is a sufficient penalty upon 
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel so as to mandate strict 
scrutiny of the provision. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969). 
155. Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Ky. 1971). 
156. See text accompanying note 114 supra. 
157. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
158. 336 U.S. at 110. 
159. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (deterring immigration of 
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classification so that its application to the designated class is "nec-
essary" to achieve the articulated state interest.160 In finding that 
classifications are not "necessary" to the asserted interest, the Court 
has utilized at least three distinct techniques: (I) it may place an 
evidentiary burden upon the state, requiring evidence that the as-
serted interest is in fact furthered by the classification;161 (2) it may 
deem that classification unnecessary if alternative "less drastic means" 
can be employed to achieve the asserted interest;162 (3) an "exacting 
standard of precision" regarding the "coverage" of the statute may be 
required-the classification will not be countenanced if it includes a 
significant number of persons whose inclusion does not further the 
asserted interest while excluding others whose inclusion would have 
furthered the asserted interest.163 Finally, even if the classification is 
necessary to promote a legitimate state interest, presumably the court 
must then determine whether the interest promoted is compelling 
when weighed against the countervailing interests infringed upon by 
the classification.164 
The Michigan student residency provision, as construed to create 
a rebuttable presumption against students' residence, 165 effected a 
classification denying voting rights of the vast majority of students, 
who would be unable to rebut the presumption. Since the presump-
tion might have been rebutted by evidence of intent to remain in-
definitely in the locale,166 the crux of the equal protection issue is 
whether the exclusion from local elections of students who do not 
intend to remain indefinitely in the locale is justified by a compelling 
state interest. 
In Wilkins, the court considered three state interests that the 
statutory provision might have promoted: (I) preserving the purity 
indigents is constitutionally impermissible purpose); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 
94 (1965) ("fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because of the 
way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible). 
160. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). 
161. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969): "The argument that 
the waiting•period requirement facilitates budget predictability is wholly unfounded. 
The records • • • are utterly devoid of evidence that either State or the District of 
Columbia in fact uses the one year requirement as a means to predict the number of 
people who will require assistance in the budget year." 
162. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4276-77 (U.S. March 21, 1972) ("wait-
ing period [for voter registration] is not the least restrictive means necessary for pre-
venting fraud," since six sections of the state code dealt with voting fraud). 
163. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). A useful 
terminology that has been suggested in connection with this problem would describe 
such a classification as both "underinclusive" and "overinclusive.'' Slightly different 
considerations may be raised by classifications that are only "underinclusive" or only 
"overinclusive.'' For a full discussion, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 40, at 344-53. 
164. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969). 
165. See text accompanying note 20 supra. 
166. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. 
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of elections;167 (2) excluding students from the franchise because of 
fear of the way they may vote;168 and (3) promoting a concerned and 
interested electorate.169 It is worth noting that the cpurt asserted 
these interests upon its own initiative because the defendant city 
clerk, and the Michigan attorney general, had declined to suggest 
any possible compelling interests.170 
1. Purity of Elections (Anti-Fraud) 
The Michigan Court of Appeals had held that the student resi-
dency provision aids in preserving the purity of elections by ensuring 
that students will not vote twice.171 While conceding that the statu-
tory provision might "to some extent aid in this purpose," the Michi-
gan supreme court believed "that [was] not sufficient to justify its 
constitutionality."172 The court gave two reasons for this conclusion. 
First, it drew upon the authority of United Mine Workers v. Illinois 
Bar Association,113 in which the Supreme Court had stated: 
"We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect 
the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because 
they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within 
the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in 
fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil."174 
In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court, faced with legislation 
infringing first amendment rights of association,176 applied estab-
lished balancing techniques in holding that the state's speculative 
interest in high standards of legal ethics did not justify the "substan-
tial impairment" of associational rights of mine workers.170 Implicit 
in the Michigan supreme court's reliance on United Mine Worlwrs 
is the proposition that the "anti-voting fraud" benefits accruring to 
the state from the voter registration provision do not justify a sub-
stantial infringement of voting rights. 
The second reason given for rejecting the "purity of elections" 
167. 385 Mich. at 685-87, 189 N.W.2d at 430. 
168. 385 Mich. at 691-93, 189 N.W.2d at 432-34. 
169. 385 Mich. at 687-90, 189 N.W.2d at 430-32. 
170. See Brief for Appellee at 5, Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N,W,2d 423 
(1971). 
171. 24 Mich. App. 422, 427, 180 N.W.2d 395, 397 {1970). 
172. 385 Mich. at 685, 189 N.W.2d at 430. 
173. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
174. 385 Mich. at 685-86, 189 N.W.2d at 430, quoting 389 U.S. at 222. 
175. At issue was an injunction preventing the union from hiring attorneys on a 
salary basis to assist its members on the ground that thls assistance constituted "un• 
authorized practice of law." The union had asserted that its members had a first amend-
ment right to legal assistance on a collective basis. See 389 U.S. at 218-21. Cf. Railroad 
Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 {1963). 
176. 389 U.S. at 225. 
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interest was that the Michigan legislature "ha[ d] provided numerous 
sanctions which insure the sanctity and purity of elections."177 The 
provisions noted by the court178 clearly establish that the registrar 
has means to check information given by registrants and that mis-
demeanor sanctions are available if the registrant has purposely given 
incorrect information.179 In light of these less drastic means it is ap-
parent that the asserted interest does not withstand "strict scru-
tiny."180 On the other hand, the "purity of elections" interest might 
raise more difficult questions if the state could show that no alterna-
tives were administratively feasible. 
2. "Fencing Out'' Students 
The court took judicial notice of a purported state interest in 
excluding students from the franchise for fear of the way they may 
vote.181 Holding this interest to be "constitutionally impermissible," 
it followed the Supreme Court's unequivocal holding in Carrington: 
" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because 
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. '[T]he 
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions,' ... cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear 
of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents."182 
But, as the language above suggests, Carrington only establishes that 
a group of otherwise bona fide residents may not be "fenced out" for 
fear of political impact. Thus it does not answer the question 
whether students may be "fenced out" because, in connection with 
some compelling state interest, independent of fear of political im-
pact, they may permissibly be deemed nonresidents.183 
3. Interested and Concer.ned Electorate 
The most troublesome of the issues treated by the Michigan su-
preme court was the question whether promoting a concerned and 
interested electorate constitutes a compelling state interest. The court 
noted that this same interest was asserted unsuccessfully in Kramer, 
177. 385 Mich. at 686, 189 N.W.2d at 430. 
178. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 168.493, .499, .508, .510, .513, .515, .523 (1967); 
§§ 168.495, .505 (Supp. 1971). 
179. See 385 Mich. at 686-87, 189 N.W.2d at 430. 
180. See note 162 supra and accompanying text. 
181. 385 Mich. at 691-93, 189 N.W.2d at 432-34. 
182. 385 Mich. at 693, 189 N.W.2d at 433, quoting 380 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted). 
183. An additional consideration is whether, assuming the existence of such an 
independent compelling interest, students may nevertheless attack the statute on 
grounds that the "motive" of the legislature was to fence them out for fear of political 
impact. The weight of authority suggests that such an attack would be unsuccessful. 
See note 99 supra and accompanying text. 
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Cipriano, Evans, and Kolodziejski, and placed primary reliance upon 
the language of Chief Justice Warren in Kramer: 
"[I]he classifications must he tailored so that the exclusion of appel-
lant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated 
state goal. Section 2012 does not meet the exacting standard of preci-
sion we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise. 
The classification in § 2012 permits inclusion of many persons who 
have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and on 
the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest 
in the school meeting decisions.''184 
The Michigan supreme court stressed: 
The provisions of MCLA § 168.ll(b) ... in regard to students, like 
§ 2012 of the New York laws in Kramer, are not sufficiently drawn 
to insure that only voters who are primarily interested are allowed to 
vote .•.. 
Clearly, MCLA § 168.ll(a) ••• (the general voter registration 
statute) ·will allow many disinterested persons, by any criteria, to 
vote, while MCLA § 168.ll(b), as applied to students, disenfranchises 
many interested and concerned citizens.185 
Moreover, in support of the proposition that many students are 
generally "interested and concerned" citizens, the court drew upon 
the standards established by the Supreme Court in Evans186 and in 
Kolodziejski.181 The court stated: 
[W]e see that students have just as many connections with the com-
munity as those found by the Supreme Court in Evans and Kolodziej-
ski. Students . • . are included in the census determination of the 
state's congressional apportionment .•.. [and] are subject to the 
state's laws and regulations. Jury lists are chosen from lists of reg-
istered voters. Thus, by denying students the right to register and 
vote, they are also denied ... trial by a jury of their peers. Students 
pay State income tax, city income tax (if any), gasoline, sales and use 
taxes .... As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, prop-
erty taxes are ultimately paid by renters such as some of the appel-
lants .... Students with children can and do enroll them in the public 
school system, and, therefore, have more than a passing interest in 
the educational standards of the community.1BB 
Furthermore, the court strengthened its attack on the rationality 
of the statutory coverage by pointing out that the statute failed to 
184. 385 Mich. at 687, 189 N.W .2d at 430, quoting 395 U.S. at 632. 
185. 385 Mich. at 687, 189 N.W.2d at 430, 431. 
186. Evans considered the community contacts of residents of the National Institute 
of Mental Health, a federal enclave in Maryland. 
187. Kolodziejski considered the interest of renters in a bond issue referendum open 
only to property owners. 
188. 385 Mich. at 688-90, 189 N.W.2d at 431-32, 
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establish special provisions for other groups more transient than stu-
dents.189 In light of its analysis, the court held that students could 
not be denied voting rights because of the state's interest in promot-
ing a concerned and interested electorate,190 and that the student resi-
dency provision was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause.191 
C. An Interested and Concerned Electorate ·Reconsidered; 
The Problem of Transients and a Distinction Between Immediate 
and Long Run Concern 
It is worthwhile to dwell upon the meaning of the Wilkins hold-
ing that promoting a concerned and interested electorate does not 
justify the provision creating a rebuttable presumption against stu-
dents' residence. The court's rationale rested upon two defects it 
noted in the coverage of the statute. First, the student classification 
was overinclusive since it included a significant number of students 
who were deemed interested and concerned citizens by the court, and 
whose inclusion therefore did not further the asserted interest in a 
concerned and interested electorate. Second, the student classifica-
tion was underinclusive since it did not include other groups more 
transient, and presumably more disinterested, than students, and the 
inclusion of these groups would have furthered the asserted interest. 
These defects go to the rationality and fairness of the classification 
and need not suggest any judgment regarding the weight of the state's 
interest in a concerned and interested electorate, were it promoted 
by a more precisely tailored classification. 
The evil of overinclusiveness is obvious as the disenfranchisement 
of interested and concerned students does not even further the state's 
interest in an interested and concerned electorate. On the other hand 
an underinclusive classification might to some extent further the 
state's interest. Its defects are more subtle. The underinclusiveness is 
differential treatment that seems prima fade contrary to notions of 
equal treatment under law. Such differential treatment may some-
times be justifiable,192 but in other cases it can be evidence of dis-
criminatory motives or sloppy drafting by the legislature. 
If we accept the premise that students are as interested and con-
cerned as other citizens, then promoting an interested and concerned 
electorate is clearly not a compelling state interest justifying the stat-
ute, since exclusion of interested and concerned students from the 
189. 385 Mich. at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432. See text accompanying notes 199-201 
infra. 
190. 385 Mich. at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432. 
191. 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W .2d at 434. 
192. See notes 220-21 infra and accompanying text. See generally Tussman &: ten-
Broek, supra note 40, at 344-53. 
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franchise in no way furthers the asserted interest. But if the students 
are not generally interested in and concerned for the local commu-
nity, then more difficult problems arise under the compelling interest 
test because the state could show that the student residency provision 
did substantially promote an interested and concerned electorate. 
Thus the nature of students' concern for the community seems a 
critical issue. 
As a starting point regarding this £actual issue the Court has 
suggested that tlie state has the burden under the compelling interest 
test of showing that the classification in fact promotes the asserted 
interest.193 Thus the burden of proof was upon Michigan to show 
that students were not generally interested and concerned citizens, 
and clearly this burden was not met in Wilkins since the state had 
declined even to suggest possible compelling interests.194 
The Michigan supreme court relied upon students' objective "con-
nections with the community"-for example, payment of taxes and 
subjection to local laws-to demonstrate that students were interested 
and concerned citizens.195 This argument appears to rest on the as-
sumption that when a person's life is connected with the community 
for a period of time sufficient to meet durational residency require-
ments that person will usually become concerned and interested in 
the community out of conscious self-interest and because of uncon-
scious reaction to events surrounding his daily life. 
A difficulty in this position is that testing the subjective interest 
of a citizen by his objective connections with the community is at 
best a rough measure since many persons with substantial objective 
ties to the community may in £act be subjectively disinterested. The 
use of this objective test may simply reflect judicial opposition to at-
tempted disenfranchisement on the basis of an alleged differential in 
interest benv-een classes of citizens when the disenfranchised have 
sufficient connections with the community. Such a concern is perhaps 
justifiable when applied to the enclave residents in Evans and to the 
nonproperty-owning citizens in Kolodziejski. Since different classes 
of citizens have different interests, "interest and concern" does not 
appear to be a concept readily susceptible of comparison benv-een 
classes or even individuals. Moreover, it may be contended that the 
grant of suffrage in a democratic society should encourage citizen 
interest as well as give voice to those already interested. 
Regardless of the justifications for relying upon objective connec-
tions with the community to demonstrate the interest of citizens in 
Evans and Kolodziejski, the validity of this test is less evident as ap-
plied to students since it £ails to focus on the essentially transient 
193. See note 161 supra and accompanying text. 
194-. See text accompanying note 170 supra. 
195. See text accompanying note 188 supra. 
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nature of most students. In contrast no contention was made in 
Evans, Kolodziejski, Cipriano, and Kramer (in which cases an interest 
in a concerned and interested electorate was asserted unsuccessfully 
by the state)196 that those persons whom the state sought to exclude 
from the franchise were transients. Therefore the state might have 
contended that even if students' connections with the community 
demonstrate immediate interest and concern, students nevertheless 
lack a long-run interest and concern for the community. 
This distinction between immediate concern and long-run con-
cern is suggested by the implicit recognition in Carrington of the 
state's interest in barring transients from the franchise197 and also by 
the traditional common-law formulation of residency that requires 
an intent to remain indefinitely.198 Nevertheless the validity of the 
proposed distinction rests upon an assumption that long-run concern 
corresponds to intent to remain indefinitely; and so those who do 
not intend to remain indefinitely have a qualitatively inferior con-
cern for the long-run welfare of the community-perhaps because 
they will neither reap the benefits nor endure the burdens arising 
from decisions with long-run effects. If this assumption were valid, 
could the state justify the rebuttable presumption against students' 
residence at issue in Wilkins by asserting an interest in promoting an 
electorate with long-run concern? 
In relation to this state interest, the classification of students is 
not overinclusive, as exclusion of most students from the vote would 
further the interest in long-run concern if the latter is evidenced by 
an intent to remain indefinitely. But as Justice Swainson observed, 
the special residency provision applicable to students does not require 
other groups equally or more transient than students to meet its pro-
visions. These other groups include operative and kindred workers, 
craftsmen, foremen, and some professionals, 199 groups representing a 
substantial number of persons. Therefore it might be contended that, 
the provision is grossly underinclusive in respect to the state's interest 
in long-run concern and that such interest is not compelling under 
the precise coverage requirement of the compelling interest doc-
trine.200 
On the other hand some workers and professionals, who appear 
more transient than students, nevertheless may have initially in-
tended to remain indefinitely in the community, their transience be-
ing a consequence of some external event such as loss of a job or 
196. See text accompanying note 184 supra. 
197. See text accompanying notes 213-14 infra. 
198. See text accompanying note 21 supra. 
199. See Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions -of a 
Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823, 830 n.10 (1963). 
200. See note 163 supra and accompanying text. 
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involuntary relocation. Thus these statistical transients may have had 
the requisite degree of long-run concern. But what of those workers 
and professionals who never intended to remain indefinitely? It 
should be noted that the group of workers who move away from the 
community as a consequence of initial intent, as opposed to some ex-
ternal event, are not a readily identifiable class within the larger 
group of transient workers. It is arguable that the precise coverage 
demanded under the compelling interest test201 does not require 
inclusion within the classification of persons who are similarly situ-
ated in relation to the state's interest but who are not members of a 
readily identifiable or ascertainable class. 
In support of this contention, commentators have noted that "the 
judicial task has really just begun" upon a finding that a classification 
is underinclusive or overinclusive.202 Specifically, it has been sug-
gested that an underinclusive classification might be justified by 
administrative considerations under some circumstances.208 The 
Court has suggested that individuals may not be deprived of funda-
mental voting righ~ because of some "remote administrative benefit 
to the State."204 However, questions with respect to more substantial 
administrative problems appear unresolved. Thus, it is possible that 
an underinclusive classification might be justifiable even under the 
compelling interest test when it can be shmvn that the nonincluded 
persons, although similarly situated in relation to the state's interest, 
are not members of an identifiable class. 
Under this theory, the fact that workers statistically more tran-
sient than students are not subject to special residency tests would 
not in and of itself be a fatal defect in the student residency provi-
sion. Thus a court could reach the question whether the interest in 
long-run concern is compelling when weighed against the substantial 
infringement of voting rights of excluded students who have immedi-
ate concern for the locale. These students are denied the right to a 
voice in governmental affairs in the community that is most impor-
tant to them. 
How substantial is the state's competing interest in promoting an 
electorate with long-run concern? It might be contended that long-
run concern is preservative of stability in local government20u and is 
conducive to responsible voting to the end of long-run welfare of the 
community. In this respect the spectre of students irresponsibly float-
ing long-term bond issues and leaving the town "holding the bag" is 
201. See note 163 supra and accompanying text. 
202. See Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 40, at 379. 
203. Id. at 349. . 
204. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). 
205. Cf. text accompanying note 12 supra. 
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relevant.206 In addition, to the extent that this contention is valid, its 
force is magnified by the concentration of students who do not intend 
to remain indefinitely in the college locale. 
Conversely, many arguments can be mounted in derogation of 
the state's interest in long-run concern. First, many persons who do 
not intend to remain indefinitely but are not members of an identi-
fiable class are permitted to register and vote, and this suggests that 
the interest in long-run concern may not be of drastic import to the 
state. Second, students with immediate concern ·will surely be 
thoughtful voters, and the interest in long-run concern is only mar-
ginal in relation to the broader societal interest in "fair and effective 
representation," which the Supreme Court has suggested lies at the 
core of our electoral process .. 207 Third, assuming that students will 
consider the ramifications of their vote upon future students, even 
those who do not intend to remain indefinitely may have some long-
run concern for the community. In other words, present student 
voters as a group may stand in the shoes of future classes of students. 
Finally, even if barring students from the franchise promotes the 
state's interest in an electorate ·with long-run concern, it seems clear 
that such disenfranchisement will tend to negate other vital interests 
of the community. Justice Brandeis in a different context noted that 
"fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate men-
aces stable government."208 Similarly, to disenfranchise and thereby 
alienate a large ever-present student body closes off legitimate chan-
nels through which students might have a voice in their community. 
Surely this "repression" is not conducive to the long-run welfare of 
the community. Moreover, the inclusion of student voters in local 
elections should enhance the democratic process in those commu-
nities; as the Court has stated, "Competition in ideas and govern-
mental policies is at the core of the electoral process .... "209 
Thus, it is contended that on balance, the state's interest in pro-
moting an electorate ·with long-run concern is not of compelling 
weight in view of the substantial denial of voting rights worked by 
the Michigan provision. 
A possibility left open by this conclusion, however, is that the 
state's interest in long-run concern might be compelling justification 
for a special student residency provision if applicable only to special 
elections dealing solely with approval of bonds and long-term financ-
ing.210 In these situations, the state's interest in long-run concern is 
206. Cf. text accompanying note 13 supra. 
207. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964). 
208. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion). 
209. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). 
210. The Supreme Court has not distinguished between general elections and special 
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of greatest force. Moreover, assuming that students could vote in the 
election of 'officials whose tenure strongly affected their daily lives, a 
limited disenfranchisement, in regard to these special elections, of 
those who do not intend to remain indefinitely would work a sub-
stantially diminished infringement of students' voting rights. There-
fore, a different balance might be struck under the compelling inter-
est test, provided that a court would first find the coverage of the 
provision satisfactory despite noninclusion of "unidentifiable" tran-
sients. This accommodation of competing interests would have the 
advantage of giving students a voice in local government, while 
assuaging some of the fears of those who oppose the student vote.211 
On the other hand, the administrative burden of a dual registration 
system may be an insurmountable obstacle to this approach. 
D. Conclusion 
The holding in Wilkins that the compelling interest test was the 
proper equal protection standard for scrutiny of the student residency 
provision is supported by the voting rights cases, by reason, and by 
policy. Al; to the application of the test, consideration of the state's 
interest supports the court's holding that the residency provision is 
not justified by a compelling state interest and is therefore in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
It is possible to read Wilkins broadly for the proposition that in 
relation to residency and voting "students must be treated the same 
as all other registrants."212 Under this view, any residency provision 
placing a special burden upon students violates the equal protection 
clause. Student residency provisions, however, might well be justified 
on several theories. Arguably, a statute placing less burden on stu-
dents' voting rights than that imposed by the Wilkins provision 
might not invoke the compelling interest test, and might be valid 
under traditional equal protection notions of rationality and reason-
ableness. In addition, it is possible that some provisions, particularly 
if limited to special purpose elections, might be justifiable under the 
compelling interest test provided that the state were able to bolster 
its contentions with actual evidence of student disinterest and pro-
vided also that a court would tolerate some degree of underinclu-
siveness if justified by administrative considerations of a substantial 
nature. Finally it is worth noting that the Court in Carrington seem-
purpose elections in cases involving residents who were allegedly "less" interested than 
other residents. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. 
City of Houma, 395 U.S. '701 (1969). However, those cases dealt with disenfranchisement 
of persons admitted to be bona fide residents, there being no contention that they did 
not intend to remain indefinitely. 
211. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra. 
212. 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434. 
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ingly approved in dictum the use by states of special residency tests 
for students and others who "present specialized problems in deter-
mining residence."213 While the weight and implications of this 
dictum are open to question, 214 it at least remains as a significant 
caveat to the Wilkins equal protection result. 
In the past decade, the equal protection clause, when interpreted 
under the compelling interest test, has come to be perhaps the pri-
mary judicial safeguard for individual civil rights and civil liberties. 
But Wilkins suggests a problem that arises from the overwhelming 
nature of the compelling interest test, wherein lies its greatest 
strength and perhaps its greatest weakness. In the voting rights con-
text a paradox arises. On the one hand, the Supreme Court's decisions 
safeguarding voting rights seem to mandate the application of the 
compelling interest test over statutes affecting all critical stages in the 
electoral process.215 On the other hand, the Court has approved some 
restrictions on voting rights, such as minimum age requirements,216 
and there may be a judicial hesitancy to extend the juggernaut-like 
compelling interest test to these requirements for fear that no statute 
would withstand scrutiny. 
One answer to this problem would be for the Court to find some 
reason for not applying the compelling interest test in hard cases217-
those in which substantial state interests are supported by a statute 
that appears to touch upon fundamental rights.218 But it seems some-
what disingenuous to have the initial determination whether to apply 
the compelling interest test tum on the foregone conclusion of the 
Court that certain restrictions are justifiable, or vice versa. The 
213. 380 U.S. at 95. 
214. Can Wilkins be reconciled with this dictum? The implied validity of special 
residency provisions for students might be disregarded as unpersuasive since while the 
Court's reasoning demonstrated that the conclusive presumption against servicemen's 
residence was invalid, it does not suggest any reasons why a rebuttable presumption 
against students' residence should be valid. On the other hand, this reconciliation is 
not wholly satisfactory since the approval of such tests was arguably not gratuitous in 
light of the total problem before the Court-how a state may determine bona fide 
residence of servicemen. While students can be distinguished from servicemen on the 
ground that they are less transient and not subject to involuntary relocation, the 
analogy is perhaps too close to be lightly dismissed. In essence, this latter view seems 
in direct conflict with Wilkins. Although the cases can be reconciled on the theory that 
some student residency provisions, less burdensome than that at issue in Wilkins, are 
valid, such a reconciliation would not appear to be within the clear thrust of Carring-
ton. In addition, in footnotes the Court suggested that residency tests involving virtually 
the equivalent of the Michigan rebuttable presumption were examples of "reasonable 
and adequate steps" which states could take to determine residence of students and 
others presenting special residency problems. 380 U.S. at 91-93 n.3, 96 n.6. 
215. See text accompanying notes 127-36, 148-54 supra. 
216. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Cf. note 221 infra. 
217. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
218. For example, it is possible that the Supreme Court might decline application 
of the compelling interest test if called upon to review eighteen-year old minimum age 
requirements for voting. See note 221 infra. 
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critical need, therefore, is for the development of judicial standards 
that would more clearly delineate when the compelling interest test 
should be invoked and what limitations exist of necessity on the 
doctrine's application under specific categorical circumstances. 
Perhaps the most troubling difficulties under the compelling in-
terest test arise in connection with the requirement of an "exacting 
standard of precision" of the classification in relation to the state's 
interests.219 Does this requirement preclude a classification that does 
not include all persons similarly situated with respect to the state's 
interest when the underinclusiveness of the statute may be necessi-
tated by the fact that those persons not included are not part of a 
readily identifiable group?220 "What if a classification must of neces-
sity be both overinclusive and underinclusive if the state is to pro-
mote a substantial interest?221 In the final analysis, the compelling 
interest doctrine will retain its vitality only through the careful doc-
trinal development of such "necessity" limitations on its require-
ments, rather than through the more expedient path of a threshold 
determination to apply the traditional equal protection standard in 
difficult cases. 
219. See note 163 supra and accompanying text. 
220. See text accompanying notes 199-204 supra. 
221. Justice Stewart has commented: 
[There has been no suggestion] that the States have anything but a constitutionally 
unimpeachable interest in establishing some age qualification as such. Yet to test 
the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest" standard 
is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a 
"compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather 
than another. 
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 294 (1970). This contention seems true under a rigid 
application of the compelling interest test requirement of an "exacting standard of 
precision." See text accompanying note 163 supra. For example, assuming an interest 
in a mature electorate asserted in justification of even an eighteen-year old minimum 
age requirement, many seventeen-year olds might have the desired maturity while 
many nineteen-year olds might not. Clearly, however, drawing the line somewhere is 
"necessary" to the state's interest. 
